Explore
Akıncı Gives Sudan’s Army Total Command of the Skies
The Sudanese Armed Forces’ recent gains in Kordofan and Blue Nile point to an increasingly visible shift in the military balance of the war.
On Friday, the army announced that it had taken control of al-Mazroub after fierce fighting, dislodging the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from one of its most important positions in North Kordofan. A day later, it said it had inflicted heavy losses on the RSF and its ally, the SPLM-N, in Blue Nile State.
These developments are not isolated battlefield successes. For weeks, the Sudanese army has been advancing steadily across North Kordofan, gradually pushing back the defensive lines established by the RSF.
After more than three years of war, the momentum the army has built is strategically significant.
The capture of al-Mazroub means more than another town changing hands on the map.
The area sits along a critical corridor linking territories controlled by the army in the north with the RSF’s principal strongholds in the west. For the Sudanese Armed Forces, this makes al-Mazroub an important node in the broader Kordofan campaign.
Modern wars are not won simply by capturing cities. Cutting an adversary’s supply lines can be just as decisive.
That is what makes the army’s advance in Kordofan important: the RSF’s ability to move men and materiel between Darfur and central Sudan is coming under growing pressure.
If the army can sustain that pressure, its current gains could translate into a much broader military advantage.
The early stages of the war were exceptionally difficult for the Sudanese Armed Forces.
When fighting erupted in Khartoum in April 2023, the army lost control of much of the capital and significant parts of central Sudan.
But the picture subsequently began to change.
The army regrouped, rebuilt its operational capacity, and gradually restored control first across central regions and later in the capital itself.
The recapture of Khartoum became one of the army’s most important military achievements of the war.
A similar process is now unfolding in Kordofan.
The RSF previously expanded its control across Darfur and gained a major advantage in western Sudan with the capture of El Fasher in October 2025. Yet the army’s recent operations make clear that the trajectory of the war is no longer moving in only one direction.
On the contrary, there are growing signs that the military initiative is shifting toward the army.
The Sudanese Armed Forces now control Khartoum as well as most of the country’s northern, eastern, and central regions.
The RSF, meanwhile, maintains control over Darfur and parts of Kordofan.
That makes Kordofan an increasingly critical theater of the war.
Analyses of conflict-monitoring data indicate that a significant share of recorded attacks during the war has occurred in Kordofan, placing the region behind only the capital in terms of conflict intensity.
Seen in this context, the capture of al-Mazroub should be understood as part of a broader campaign rather than an isolated tactical victory.
The central challenge for the Sudanese army is now to turn these gains into a strategy capable of systematically weakening the RSF’s logistical network in the west.
If it succeeds, the advance through Kordofan could have consequences far beyond the region itself and potentially reshape the trajectory of the wider war.
The army’s recent operations are not confined to Kordofan.
Intense fighting is also under way against RSF and SPLM-N forces in Blue Nile State.
The Sudanese army says it inflicted heavy losses on opposing forces in the Minza and Bashkarkad areas.
An alleged drone attack targeting the residence of the state governor was also reportedly intercepted by air-defense systems.
The incident suggests that the army retains not only offensive capabilities on the ground but also the capacity to defend strategically important areas.
Blue Nile’s importance derives largely from geography.
The state lies in southeastern Sudan along the border with Ethiopia. Security there therefore affects not only Sudan’s internal balance but also the wider stability of the Horn of Africa.
Sudan’s humanitarian crisis remains severe.
Millions face food insecurity, millions more have been displaced, and the deterioration of the economy continues to place extraordinary pressure on ordinary households.
That reality makes clear that military gains alone will not solve Sudan’s crisis.
Yet economic recovery, the regular delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the restoration of functioning public institutions are all exceedingly difficult without basic security and the re-establishment of state authority.
The expansion of army-controlled territory therefore matters not only in military terms, but also for the potential restoration of state institutions and civilian administration.
The recapture of Khartoum was the first major example of this dynamic.
If the advance in Kordofan continues, it could create the conditions for the government to re-establish administrative authority across a broader portion of the country.
The most important question facing the Sudanese army is no longer whether it can capture individual towns.
The real issue is whether its successes in Kordofan can be translated into sustained pressure on the supply routes, logistical hubs, and freedom of movement that underpin the RSF’s ability to wage war.
If the army can consolidate control over strategic locations such as al-Mazroub and continue advancing westward, it could increasingly threaten the connections linking the RSF’s stronghold in Darfur with the rest of the country.
That would represent a significant shift in the overall balance of the war.
After suffering major setbacks during the opening phases of the conflict, the Sudanese Armed Forces have retaken the capital, restored control across much of central Sudan, and are now advancing in Kordofan.
The army that emerges from this picture is therefore markedly different from the force seen three years ago: it has reorganized, recovered territory it once lost, and is increasingly reclaiming the operational initiative.
The war is not over.
But developments in recent weeks suggest that the Sudanese army is no longer merely defending its positions. It is beginning to exert the kind of sustained military pressure that could alter the course of the conflict.
